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MENTAL HEALTH COURTS AND TITLE II OF THE ADA: 
ACCESSIBILITY TO STATE COURT SYSTEMS FOR INDIVIDUALS 
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE NEED FOR DIVERSION 
RONDA CRESS,* AND J. NEIL GRINDSTAFF,** 
S. ELIZABETH MALLOY*** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Individuals with disabilities face a wide spectrum of unique challenges in 
our society.  In fact, people with disabilities face special problems in 
exercising some of their most fundamental rights—rights that many in 
American society take for granted.  Access to the judicial system, a 
fundamental right that has paramount importance in our society, can often 
present obstacles to people with disabilities in a variety of significant ways.  
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“Title II”) mandates 
that state and local judicial facilities, and the provision of government 
programs and services, when viewed in their entirety should be accessible to 
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individuals with disabilities.1  Furthermore, state and local government 
programs that are recipients of federal funding are also subject to the mandates 
of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), which 
requires basically the same degree of accessibility as is required by Title II.  
Federal judicial facilities are also subject to Sections 504 and 501 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, but do not meet the definition of a “public entity” as it is 
defined in the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and are therefore not 
covered under Title II.2 
Analysis of the disability antidiscrimination legislation, implementing 
regulations, technical assistance manual, applicable case law on judicial access 
and the ADA’s protection of those with mental disabilities, and the policy 
behind the creation of mental health courts suggests that mental health courts 
may be successful in practice and withstand ADA scrutiny.  In addition, 
information on existing mental health courts in cities in Ohio and around the 
country will help determine whether mental health courts can pass statutory 
muster under the ADA by reducing recidivism and supplying people with 
mental disabilities the treatment that they might not otherwise receive through 
participation in the mainstream judicial system.  Moreover, if people with 
mental disabilities are not receiving adequate or sufficiently equal 
opportunities within regular state court systems, mental health courts, or at 
least some aspects of these courts or other similar remedies, are arguably 
necessary requirements for state courts to be in compliance with ADA 
mandates by being readily accessible to persons with mental disabilities. 
In Part II, the paper gives a more detailed account of the background and 
history of the disability antidiscrimination legislation that Congress has 
enacted to counteract widespread discrimination against individuals with 
physical and mental impairments in the United States.  Closer examination of 
the statutory language of the ADA, viewed in conjunction with Congress’ 
intent in passing the legislation, demonstrates how and why the statutory 
protection should be applied to individuals with mental disabilities who are 
seeking access to the judicial system at state and local levels.  Additionally, 
careful analysis of the Department of Justice’s regulations for the 
implementation of Title II and the Technical Assistance Manual for Title II 
(“TAM”) provides information intended to better instruct state court systems 
as to their legal obligation to provide readily accessible services to individuals 
with mental disabilities. 
Part II also takes a closer look at the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Tennessee v. Lane,3 which dealt with whether Congress had § 5 authority to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against the states by enacting Title II, 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132 (West 2006). 
 2. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (West 2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12131. 
 3. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
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thereby abrogating states’ immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.4  
Examination of the Court’s analysis in Lane indicates that Congress completed 
a great deal of research and deliberation before drafting Title II to remedy the 
systemic deprivation of fundamental rights to individuals based solely on the 
fact that a person is physically or mentally disabled.  The evidence of the 
historical problem of discrimination in the provision of judicial accessibility to 
persons with disabilities probably persuaded the Court that Title II was 
congruent and proportional to the harm that it was enacted to prevent. 
Part III discusses the historical context giving rise to the creation of mental 
health courts and describes the first modern mental health courts.5  Part IV 
explores the challenges and criticisms faced by these specialty courts.6  Part V 
evaluates mental health courts under two integral concepts of Title II, 
accessibility and integration, and it concludes that mental health courts may 
withstand scrutiny under Title II.7  Part VI then evaluates how the State of 
Ohio is addressing the increase of defendants who are mentally ill in its 
criminal justice system.8  Finally, Part VII concludes that, despite the 
imperfections of mental health courts, the goals and policies of these courts are 
aligned with Congress’s intent in enacting Title II.9  Moreover, if individuals 
who have mental disabilities are denied sufficiently equal opportunities by a 
state’s mainstream judicial system, then Title II may require that mental health 
courts, or some other similar remedy, be provided so that the judicial system is 
readily accessible to persons with mental disabilities. 
II.  STATUTORY PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION BASED ON 
DISABILITIES: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
Over the years, Congress has recognized that individuals with disabilities 
face discrimination in almost every aspect of their lives.10  To combat this 
discrimination, Congress has invoked its powers under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to help put individuals with disabilities on an equal playing field 
with others in American society.11  Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act 
and the ADA in an effort to provide more expansive protection against 
discrimination for individuals with physical and mental disabilities in the 
United States.12 
 
 4. See infra notes 3-134 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 135-236 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 237-51 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 252-74 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 275-300 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 301-04 and accompanying text. 
 10. See 29 U.S.C. § 701(a) (West 2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (West 2006). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). 
 12. 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)-(c); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). 
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A. Background, Purpose, and Analysis of Claims Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 
The ADA stems from its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act.13  The 
Rehabilitation Act was enacted to protect against discrimination of disabled 
individuals solely on the basis of their disability.14  However, its scope was 
limited to cover only state and local governments that received federal 
funding.15  Because many state and local programs, including many state court 
systems, do not receive federal assistance, more expansive antidiscrimination 
legislation was needed in order to protect individuals with disabilities from 
being discriminated against by state and local governments and their agencies 
in the provision of services, programs, and activities.16  In 1990, Congress 
promulgated the ADA, drawing from the language of the Rehabilitation Act, 
with the express purpose of codifying a “national mandate for the elimination 
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” in all areas of society.17 
The ADA expanded upon the protection against disability discrimination 
that the Rehabilitation Act had provided by including individuals, private 
businesses, and organizations, as well as the government, under the auspices of 
a disability antidiscrimination statute.18  The ADA was enacted with the 
express congressional intent of eliminating the utilization of fear and negative 
stereotypes of the disabled from both employment decisions and in the 
allocation of public services in the United States.19  Congress clearly intended 
to put persons with disabilities on an equal footing with the rest of society.20 
Congress noted in the ADA’s “findings” section that “some 43,000,000 
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is 
increasing as the population as a whole is growing older . . . .”21  Furthermore, 
Congress declared that individuals with disabilities have historically faced 
isolation and segregation within American society, and that this problem 
persists in such “critical areas as employment, housing, public 
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, 
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.”22  
Congress further noted that unlike other forms of invidious discrimination, 
people with disabilities have had “no legal recourse to redress such 
 
 13. LAURA ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 18 (2002). 
 14. § 701(a)-(c). 
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b) (West 2006). 
 16. See Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 475-76 (1991). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12131(1), 12181(7) (West 2006). 
 19. § 12101(a)-(b)(1). 
 20. See § 12101(a)(8), (b)(1)-(2). 
 21. § 12101(a)(1). 
 22. § 12101(a)(2)-(3). 
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discrimination.”23  In addition, Congress found that individuals with 
disabilities continue to encounter many forms of discrimination, and according 
to census data, national polls, and other studies, persons with disabilities 
“occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged 
socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally,” and are therefore 
a discrete and insular minority who have been . . . subjected to a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political 
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the 
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not 
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, 
and contribute to, society . . . .24 
Congress determined that the proper goals regarding individuals with 
disabilities in the United States are to “assure equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such 
individuals . . . .”25  Finally, Congress found that discrimination based on 
disabilities “denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an 
equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is 
justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in 
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and non-productivity.”26  
Congress also explicitly stated that the ADA’s purpose was, 
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing 
the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with 
disabilities; and 
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to 
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with 
disabilities.27 
In reviewing ADA claims for unlawful disability discrimination, federal 
courts must first determine whether an individual meets the statutory definition 
of being “disabled.”28  Next, the individual must be “otherwise qualified” to 
 
 23. § 12101(a)(4). 
 24. § 12101(a)(6)-(7). 
 25. § 12101(a)(8). 
 26. § 12101(a)(9). 
 27. § 12101(b). 
 28. See 42 U.S.C. §12111(8) (West 2006). 
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carry out the fundamental requirements of the program with or without 
reasonable accommodations.29  The individual must then prove that 
discrimination has taken place and that they have been discriminated against 
by an entity that is covered by the ADA.30  These issues are quite complex and 
the outcome of the analysis can vary greatly depending on the nature and 
context of the claim. 
1. Analysis for Being Considered “Disabled” Under the ADA 
The ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability and defines a 
disability for purposes of the statute as: 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of the major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.31 
In determining whether or not an individual has a disability that is covered 
by the ADA, the first step of the analysis is to determine whether or not there is 
a physical or mental impairment.32  The regulations that were issued by the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) interpreting § 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act are informative in making this determination.33  The 
HEW listed several specific conditions in defining “physical or mental 
impairment” to mean: 
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: 
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, 
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, 
genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or 
(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, 
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific 
learning disabilities.34 
 
 29. § 12111(8). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112(a)-(b) (West 2006). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (West 2006) (emphasis added).  See Susan Stefan, Unequal Rights: 
Discrimination Against People with Mentral Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
Washington, DC, American Psychological Association (June 2001). 
 32. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998). 
 33. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 (West 2006).  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is the disability 
antidiscrimination statute that predated and served as the basis for many provisions of the ADA.  
See Laura Rothstein, Disability Law (2002). 
 34. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A)-(B). 
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The HEW determined that it was not sensible to enumerate the number or 
types of disabilities that should be covered by the statute because such an 
enumeration might result in no coverage under the antidiscrimination statute 
those not specifically mentioned by the legislation.35  However, a 
representative list of conditions that constitute physical or mental impairments 
was contained in the commentary to the regulations, including “such diseases 
and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral 
palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, 
diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, and drug addiction and 
alcoholism.”36 
Next, an evaluating court must look at the life activity that is affected by 
the impairment and determine whether or not it is a major life activity.37  The 
third and final consideration for whether or not a person has a disability under 
the ADA ties the first two parts of the analysis together by looking to see if the 
impairment actually limits a major life activity.38  The ADA also provides 
protection for those who may not have a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity; if it can be demonstrated that they had 
a previous record of, or are incorrectly regarded as having such an impairment 
by the party who is discriminating against them.39 
Although through the ADA, Congress does provide protection for persons 
who have had past drug and alcohol abuse problems, as long as those 
individuals meet certain requirement, the statute’s definition of disability does 
not include an individual who is “currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, 
when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.”40  This distinction is 
important for some defendants with mental disabilities, as it is not uncommon 
for persons with mental disabilities to also suffer from alcohol or drug 
addiction problems.41 
2. Otherwise Qualified 
Title I of the ADA, concerning employment, and Title II, concerning the 
allocation of public services, contain requirements that a disabled individual be 
 
 35. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A. 
 36. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A. 
 37. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(B)-(C) (West 2006). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 12210(a)-(b) (West 2006) (emphasis added).  These requirements for the 
former drug and alcohol abuser include participating on a supervised rehabilitation program and 
no longer engaging in the use of drugs or alcohol.  Id. 
 41. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CO-OCCURRING MENTAL AND 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE DISORDERS: A GUIDE FOR MENTAL HEALTH PLANNING + ADVISORY 
COUNCILS 3 (2003), available at http://media.shs.net/ken/pdf/NMH03-0146/NMH03-0146.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
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“otherwise qualified,” with or without reasonable accommodations, in order to 
come under the protection of the statute.42  For purposes of determining 
whether the ADA applies to a particular individual with a disability, Title II 
defines that term in the following manner: 
The term “qualified individual with a disability” means an individual with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or 
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation 
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential 
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public entity.43 
If a person does not meet the statutory definition of “qualified individual 
with a disability[,]” then the ADA does not apply to them.  Additionally, if a 
person with a disability is determined to be a “direct threat” to the safety or 
health of others, then he or she is also not considered to be otherwise qualified, 
and is thus not protected by the ADA.44 
3. Major Life Activities 
To meet the definition of disability for purposes of applying the ADA, an 
individual must not only have a physical or mental impairment, but that 
impairment must also substantially limit at least one of that individual’s major 
life activities.45  In holding that asymptomatic HIV/AIDS meets the definition 
of a disability under the ADA framework, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bragdom 
v. Abbott stated that “[t]he [ADA] statute is not operative, and the definition 
not satisfied, unless the impairment affects a major life activity.”46  The Court 
went on to explain what should be considered as major life activities for 
purposes of applying the ADA: 
[T]he ADA must be construed to be consistent with regulations issued to 
implement the Rehabilitation Act.  Rather than enunciating a general principle 
for determining what is and is not a major life activity, the Rehabilitation Act 
regulations instead provide a representative list, defining the term to include 
“functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, 
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”  As the use of the 
term “such as” confirms, the list is illustrative, not exhaustive.47 
 
 42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12131(2) (West 2006). 
 43. § 12131(2). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (West 2006). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (West 2006). 
 46. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637, 639 (1998). 
 47. Id. at 638-39 (citations omitted). 
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4. Substantial Limitation on Major Life Activity 
In Bragdon, the Court gave further guidance as to the final element that 
must be met before the ADA is applicable: whether an individual’s physical or 
mental impairment poses a substantial limitation on the major life activity that 
he or she asserts has been affected by the impairment.48  In addressing the fact 
that conception and childbirth are not completely foreclosed to an HIV-
positive woman, the Court noted that “[t]he Act addresses substantial 
limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities. . . . When significant 
limitations result from the impairment, the definition is met even if the 
difficulties are not insurmountable.”49 
Many of the mental impairments that are listed in the HEW regulations 
above (any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, 
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning 
disabilities) and those that were mentioned by the Court in Bragdon, arguably 
pose substantial limitations on several major life activities, including the ability 
to care for oneself, work, take care of family obligations, interact with others, 
etc., even if it were disputed that these life activities should be considered as 
“major” for purposes of the statute.  The ADA itself, the implementing 
regulations discussed in more detail below, and the holdings of the Supreme 
Court reinforce the determination that mental and developmental disorders are 
qualifying impairments under the ADA. 
B. The Applicability of Title II to State Court Systems 
Unlike its predecessor, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the 
ADA prohibits discrimination based on disabilities by public entities, whether 
or not they receive federal funding.50  Public entities include “any department, 
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or . . . local 
government . . . .”51  Title II can be used to protect the disabled in a variety of 
ways, including the protection of voting rights by requiring accessible polling 
stations and protection of the right of access to the courts by requiring 
accessible courtrooms and courthouses.52  Title II broadly states “no qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
 
 48. Id. at 631. 
 49. Id. at 641. 
 50. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1)(A)-(B), 12132 (West 2006). 
 51. § 12131(1)(B). 
 52. See The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Voting: Federal Laws Can Overcome 
Barriers to the Ballot, http://www.bazelon.org/issues/voting/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2006) (“The 
effectiveness of the ADA has not yet been tested in several areas relating to voting rights of 
people with mental disabilities. . . . [But one] case banned their improper exclusion from voting 
through vague or overbroad competency standards and the need for reasonable accommodations 
in the voting process.”). 
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participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities 
of a public entity or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”53 
Once an individual has a physical or mental disability meets the statutory 
definition laid out in the previous section, state courts are required by Title II 
to provide accessible judicial services to that individual.54  Success in meeting 
this requirement is evaluated by looking at a state’s court system as a whole.  
In the next section, we utilize the Department of Justice’s guidance, as stated in 
the ADA’s implementing regulations and in the explanations and illustrations 
found in the Technical Assistance Manual (TAM), to evaluate the applicability 
of Title II to state and local judicial systems in an effort to better instruct state 
court systems as to their legal obligations for the provision of judicial services 
to persons with mental disabilities. 
1. The Implementing Regulations and Title II’s Technical Assistance 
Manual 
In 1991, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the agency 
charged with interpreting Title II, issued Title II’s implementing regulations, 
which include a more detailed interpretation of how the ADA is to be applied 
to state and local governments.55  In addition, the DOJ published the TAM that 
is updated annually to help state and local governments with the 
implementation and interpretation of the law.56  The express purpose of the 
TAM is “to present the ADA’s requirements for state and local governments in 
a format that will be useful to the widest possible audience.”57  The DOJ’s 
regulations and accompanying preambles were “carefully reorganized to 
provide a focused, systematic description of the ADA’s requirements. . . . [T]o 
avoid an overly legalistic style without sacrificing completeness.”58 
The DOJ’s implementing regulations define the reach of Title II in such a 
manner that it clearly includes state court systems: 
The scope of title II’s coverage of public entities is comparable to the coverage 
of Federal Executive agencies under the 1978 amendment to section 504, 
which extended section 504’s application to all programs and activities 
“conducted by” Federal Executive agencies, in that title II applies to anything a 
public entity does. Title II coverage, however, is not limited to “Executive” 
 
 53. § 12132. 
 54. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 511 (2004). 
 55. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 (West 2006). 
 56. See THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
MANUAL Introduction, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman2.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006) 
[hereinafter “TAM”]. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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agencies, but includes activities of the legislative and judicial branches of 
State and local governments.59 
In Subpart B to the implementation regulations, which addresses the 
general prohibition against discrimination that is codified in the ADA, the DOJ 
explained that after reviewing the notice of proposed rule-making, numerous 
commenters suggested that the proposed regulations should be amended to 
include the requirement that law enforcement and court personnel be trained to 
recognize the difference between criminal activity and mental disabilities, 
including mental retardation, cerebral palsy, traumatic brain injury, mental 
illness, or other disabilities such as deafness or the effects of seizures.60  The 
DOJ declined to mandate a training requirement for law enforcement or court 
personnel, even though several disabled commenters gave personal statements 
detailing serious abuse that they had suffered at the hands of law enforcement 
personnel.61  The DOJ instead remarked that behavior of this sort is already 
considered unlawful, and rather than amend the regulation, the DOJ 
encouraged the states that had not already adopted the Uniform Duties to 
Disabled Persons Act to consider that approach to solve the problem of police 
brutality and violence that is misdirected toward the mentally disabled.62 
The ADA clearly states that it is unlawful to discriminate against an 
otherwise qualified individual with a physical or mental impairment.63  The 
TAM adopts the same definition of mental impairment that appeared in the 
HEW regulations that were used in the implementation of the Rehabilitation 
Act, as discussed in greater detail above.64  For purposes of applying the ADA 
and Rehabilitation Act, a mental impairment is defined as any “mental or 
psychological disorder, such as retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional 
or mental illness, or specific learning disabilities.”65 
When the HEW issued the regulations that implemented the Rehabilitation 
Act, the DOJ “decided against including a list of disorders constituting 
physical or mental impairments, out of concern that any specific enumeration 
might not be comprehensive.”66  However, the DOJ does explain in the TAM 
for Title II that some characteristics are not meant to fall under Title II’s 
protection, including “disadvantages attributable to environmental, cultural, or 
economic factors . . . common personality traits such as poor judgment or a 
quick temper, where these are not symptoms of a mental or psychological 
 
 59. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.102 (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
 60. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.130. 
 61. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.130. 
 62. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A. 
 63. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (West 2006). 
 64. See TAM, supra note 56, at II-2.2000. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 633 (1998). 
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disorder.”67  Additionally, for purposes of Title II, “[t]he phrase ‘physical or 
mental impairment’ does not include homosexuality or bisexuality.”68 
The implementing regulations also explain that it is discriminatory under 
Title II to deny a person with a mental disability the right to participate in or 
benefit from the aid, benefit, or services that are provided by a state or local 
government entity.69  The regulations permit state and local governments 
to develop separate or different . . . benefits, or services when necessary to 
provide [disabled] individuals . . . with an equal opportunity to participate 
in . . . the public entity’s programs or activities, but only when necessary to 
ensure that the . . . benefits, or services are as effective as those provided to 
others. . . . Even when separate or different . . . benefits, or services would be 
more effective . . . a qualified [disabled] individual . . . still has the right to 
choose to participate in the program that is not designed to accommodate 
individuals with disabilities.70 
Title II requires a state or local government entity to make its programs 
readily accessible in all cases, except where to do so would “result in a 
fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in 
undue financial and administrative burdens.”71  This requirement is in contrast 
to the obligations imposed under Title III of the Act, which “requires public 
accommodations to remove architectural barriers where such removal is 
‘readily achievable,’ or to provide goods and services through alternative 
methods, where those methods are ‘readily achievable.’”72  The DOJ 
concluded in the ADA’s implementing regulations that 
Congress intended the “undue burden” standard in title II to be significantly 
higher than the “readily achievable” standard in title III. . . . [And that] the 
program access requirement of title II should enable individuals with 
disabilities to participate in and benefit from the services, programs, or 
activities of public entities in all but the most unusual cases.73 
Furthermore, the TAM makes it clear that a public entity is not relieved of 
its duty to make its facilities, programs, and services accessible simply because 
no individuals with disabilities are known to live in the area served by the 
entity.74  If the ADA allowed this type of test for when public entities should 
 
 67. TAM, supra note 56, at II-2.2000. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i) (West 2006). 
 70. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (West 2006). 
 71. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (West 2006). 
 72. DEP’T OF JUST., NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY IN STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES § 35.150 (Jan. 1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/ 
reg2.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006) [hereinafter “NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF 
DISABILITY”]. 
 73. Id. 
 74. TAM, supra note 56, at II-5.1000. 
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be required to make their public facilities, programs, and services readily 
accessible, it would have the inherent effect of discouraging individuals with 
disabilities from moving to that particular area, thus subjugating the ADA’s 
expressed purpose of achieving greater integration for individuals with 
disabilities in American society. 
The DOJ realized that implementation of Title II could be quite 
burdensome on public entities, both financially and in terms of practicality.75  
For this reason, the ADA allows some public facilities, programs, and services 
to go unaltered if they meet certain criteria.76  The implementation regulations 
explain that, 
[a]lthough a public entity is not required to take actions that would result in a 
fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in 
undue financial and administrative burdens, it nevertheless must take any other 
steps necessary to ensure that individuals with disabilities receive the benefits 
or services provided by the public entity.77 
The DOJ set forth a number of methods by which program accessibility 
can be achieved, including “redesign of equipment, reassignment of services to 
accessible buildings, [and] assignment of aides.”78  In recognition of the fact 
that structural changes to facilities and significant alterations to programs and 
services may not always be economically or administratively feasible, the 
TAM states that the “public entity may, however, pursue alternatives to 
structural changes [and significant alterations to programs and services] in 
order to achieve program accessibility.  Nonstructural methods include 
acquisition or redesign of equipment, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, and 
provision of services at alternate accessible sites.”79  The TAM provides the 
following instructive examples: 
ILLUSTRATION 1: The office building housing a public welfare agency may 
only be entered by climbing a flight of stairs. If an individual with a mobility 
impairment seeks information about welfare benefits, the agency can provide 
the information in an accessible ground floor location or in another accessible 
building. 
ILLUSTRATION 2: A public library’s open stacks are located on upper floors 
having no elevator. As an alternative to installing a lift or elevator, library staff 
may retrieve books for patrons who use wheelchairs. The aides must be 
available during the operating hours of the library. 
 
 75. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3). 
 76. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3). 
 77. NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY, supra note 72, at § 35.150. 
 78. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1). 
 79. TAM, supra note 56, at II-5.2000. 
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ILLUSTRATION 3: A public university that conducts a French course in an 
inaccessible building may relocate the course to a building that is readily 
accessible.80 
The DOJ declared in the implementing regulations that alterations to 
existing facilities, programs, and services “would in most cases not result in 
undue financial and administrative burdens on a public entity.”81  The DOJ 
also concluded that all of a public entity’s available resources that are 
earmarked for use in the funding and operation of a service, program, or 
activity should be taken into account to determine whether or not the financial 
and administrative burdens are undue.82  The TAM gives an additional 
explanation of the standard for determining whether an alteration is an undue 
burden: 
If an action would result in such an alteration or such burdens, the public entity 
must take any other action that would not result in such an alteration or such 
burdens but would nevertheless ensure that individuals with disabilities receive 
the benefits and services of the program or activity.83 
The public entity has the burden of proving that compliance with Title II 
would fundamentally alter the nature of a service, program, or activity or 
would result in undue financial and administrative burdens.84  Should a public 
entity claim that the government would be unduly burdened by an alteration, 
the head of the public entity, or his or her designee, must make this decision 
and must provide a written statement of the reasons that he or she has come to 
that conclusion.85  In recognition of the fact that it is sometimes difficult to 
determine who the head of a state or local entity actually is, the DOJ declared 
in the implementing regulations that the determination shall be made by “a 
high level official, no lower than a Department head, having budgetary 
authority and responsibility for making spending decisions.”86 
An individual with a disability who objects to how a public entity has 
treated them because of their disability can bring a complaint under the 
procedures specified in the regulations.87 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY, supra note 72, at § 35.150. 
 82. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3). 
 83. TAM, supra note 56, at II-5.1000. 
 84. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3). 
 85. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3). 
 86. NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY, supra note 72, at § 35.150. 
 87. Title II provides specific remedial procedures for an individual who believes that he or 
she, as an individual or as part of any specific class of persons, has been injured by the decision 
(or lack thereof) by a public entity that alterations would be unduly burdensome.  They are 
instructed to file a complaint under the compliance procedures established in the implementation 
regulations, which provide that a complainant should file a complaint with any federal agency 
within 180 days. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.170(a)-(b).  The TAM gives additional guidance for disabled 
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In determining whether or not state court systems must comply with Title 
II, it is important to note that Title II only applies to public entities that employ 
more than 50 persons.88  In regards to state court systems, the TAM 
unequivocally resolves this issue by stating that because “all States have at 
least 50 employees, all State departments, agencies, and other divisional units 
are subject to title II’s administrative requirements applicable to public entities 
with 50 or more employees.”89 
Since many state court systems, located both in large urban centers and in 
small rural areas, are implementing mental health courts, the development of 
this type of alternative judicial service is likely within the budgetary reach and 
in the best interest of, state judicial systems. 
2. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Applicability of Title II 
to State Court Systems: Tennessee v. Lane 
Since the ADA was enacted, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that Title II 
does apply to state court systems.  In Tennessee v. Lane, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that Title II’s abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity was a legitimate exercise of Congress’ enforcement power under § 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the fundamental right of access 
to state courts.90  While this decision dealt directly with physical access to 
courtrooms and courthouse facilities for the physically disabled,91 it is likely 
that the Court’s decision should be applied to guarantee the mentally disabled 
access to the state court systems as well. 
Respondents George Lane and Beverly Jones, who were both paraplegics 
that required the use of a wheelchair for mobility, sued the State of Tennessee 
 
individuals, stating that a complaint may be filed in a variety of places, including with a Federal 
agency that provides funding to the public entity that is the subject of the complaint, with a 
Federal agency designated in the Title II regulation to investigate Title II complaints, or with the 
Department of Justice. See TAM, supra note 56, at II-9.2000.  Alternatively, an aggrieved party 
can also bring a lawsuit in a Federal district court. Id. at II-9.1000.  The TAM also provides that: 
The Federal agency processing the complaint will resolve the complaint through informal 
means or issue a detailed letter containing findings of fact and conclusions of law and, 
where appropriate, a description of the actions necessary to remedy each violation.  Where 
voluntary compliance cannot be achieved, the complaint may be referred to the 
Department of Justice for enforcement.  In cases where there is Federal funding, fund 
termination is also an enforcement option. 
Id. at II-9.2000. 
 88. See TAM, supra note 56, at II-8.1000. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004).  For further discussion of this case, see 
Timothy J. Cahill & Betsy Malloy, Overcoming the Obstacles of Garrett: An “As Applied” 
Saving Construction for the ADA’s Title II, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 133 (2004). 
 91. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513, 533-34. 
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and a number of Tennessee counties, claiming “that they were denied access 
to, and the services of, the state court system because of their disabilities.”92 
Mr. Lane was compelled to appear by a state trial court to answer a set of 
criminal charges on the second floor of a county courthouse that had no 
elevator.93  For his first appearance, Mr. Lane had crawled up the stairs in 
order to get to the courtroom.94  When he returned to the courthouse for a 
subsequent hearing, he refused to crawl up the stairs and he also refused to 
allow officers to carry him up to the second floor courtroom.95  The judge had 
Mr. Lane arrested for failing to appear at the hearing.96 
Ms. Jones was a certified court reporter in the State of Tennessee, who 
claimed that she lost a great deal of work and the opportunity to participate in 
the judicial process because she was unable to gain access to many county 
courthouses.97 
In finding that Congress had acted within its enforcement power under § 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court described the breadth of Congress’ 
§ 5 power as follows: 
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the 
amendments have in view, whatever trends to enforce submission to the 
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect 
equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial 
or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional 
power.98 
The Court applied the “congruence and proportionality” test, in which 
legislation is “valid if it exhibits ‘a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.’”99  The 
majority, by way of illustration, explained how previous cases before the Court 
that dealt with Congress’ use of its § 5 power remedial were valid because the 
injury or remedy that was meant to be prevented passed or failed the 
congruence and proportionality test.100 
Probably most relevant to the Court’s analysis in Lane was its recent 2001 
decision in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, a case in which the Court found that 
the Eleventh Amendment bars private suits seeking monetary damages for 
state violations of Title I of the ADA.101  In Garrett, the Court concluded, 
 
 92. Id. at 513. 
 93. Id. at 513-14. 
 94. Id. at 514. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Lane, 541 U.S. at 514. 
 98. Id. at 518, n.3 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880)). 
 99. Id. at 520 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). 
 100. Id. at 521. 
 101. Id. at 514. 
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“Congress’ exercise of its prophylactic § 5 power was unsupported by a 
relevant history and pattern of constitutional violations.”102  The Court in 
Garrett left open the possibility that money damages for violation of Title II 
may pass the congruence and proportionality test.103  In Garrett, the Court 
identified the constitutional right or rights that Congress sought to enforce by 
enacting Title I as the prohibition against irrational disability discrimination.104  
The Lane Court noted that Title II seeks to enforce the same prohibition, but 
unlike Title I, Title II also “seeks to enforce a variety of other basic 
constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching 
judicial review.”105 
The Court noted that the right of access to the court system is protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the Due Process and 
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment; as well as a right to access to criminal proceedings 
that is guaranteed by the First Amendment.106 
In Lane, the Court gave numerous examples that “document a pattern of 
unequal treatment in the administration of a wide range of public services, 
programs, and activities, including the penal system, public education, and 
voting.”107  The Court recognized that this pattern of discrimination continued 
despite several federal and state legislative attempts to remedy the problem.108 
The Court also took note of the extensive deliberations and research that 
went into drafting the ADA.109  Through this research, Congress discovered 
that many individuals from across the country were being excluded from 
courthouses and court proceedings because of their disabilities: 
 
 102. Id. at 521 (citing Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368, 374 (2001)). 
 103. Lane, 541 U.S. at 514. 
 104. Id. at 522. 
 105. Id. at 522-23. 
 106. Id. at 523 (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court of Cal., County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1986); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
819, n.15 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 
371, 379 (1971)). 
 107. Id. at 525 & nn.11-13 (citing Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996 (6th Cir. 1999) (deaf inmate 
denied access to sex offender therapy program allegedly required as precondition for parole); 
LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 (4th Cir. 1987) (paraplegic inmate unable to access toilet 
facilities); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (exclusion of mentally 
retarded students from the public school system); Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me. 
2001) (disenfranchisement of persons under guardianship by reason of mental illness); New York 
ex. rel. Spitzer v. County of Delaware, 82 F. Supp. 2d 12 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (mobility-impaired 
voters unable to access county polling places); Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Kan. 
1999) (double amputee forced to crawl around the floor of a jail); New York State Assn. for 
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487, 504 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (segregation of 
mentally retarded students with hepatitis B)). 
 108. Id. at 526. 
 109. Lane, 541 U.S. at 526. 
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A report before Congress showed that some 76% of public services and 
programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable 
by persons with disabilities, even taking into account the possibility that the 
services and programs might be restructured or relocated to other parts of the 
buildings.  Congress itself heard testimony from persons with disabilities who 
described the physical inaccessibility of local courthouses.  And its appointed 
task force heard numerous examples of the exclusion of persons with 
disabilities from state judicial services and programs, including exclusion of 
persons with visual impairments from jury service, failure of state and local 
governments to provide interpretive services for the hearing impaired, failure 
to permit the testimony of adults with developmental disabilities in abuse 
cases, and failure to make courtrooms accessible to witnesses with physical 
disabilities.110 
This evidence of a systemic problem of discrimination against disabled 
individuals influenced the Court in Lane to find that Congress’s determination, 
as articulated in the ADA itself, “makes clear beyond peradventure that 
inadequate provision of public services and access to public facilities was an 
appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation.”111 
Next, the Court determined whether or not Title II was an appropriate 
response to the history and pattern of disability discrimination in American 
society.112  The State of Tennessee urged the Court to find that Title II is 
overbroad in that it attempts to regulate everything from schools, to voting 
booths, to hockey arenas, to the courthouse.113  The Court was not persuaded 
“to examine the broad range of Title II’s applications all at once,” but rather 
focused on the question presented in the case: “whether Congress had the 
power under § 5 to enforce the constitutional right of access to the courts.”114 
The Court determined that “Congress’ chosen remedy for the pattern of 
exclusion and discrimination described above, Title II’s requirement of 
program accessibility, is congruent and proportional to its objective of 
enforcing the right of access to the courts.”115  While the Court recognized that 
the remedy that Congress created in Title II is a powerful one, the majority also 
noted that it is nevertheless limited: 
Title II does not require States to employ any and all means to make judicial 
services accessible to persons with disabilities . . . .  It requires only 
“reasonable modifications” that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the 
 
 110. Id. at 527 (citations omitted). 
 111. Id. at 529. 
 112. Id. at 530. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 530-31. 
 115. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531. 
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service provided, and only when the . . . [person who is] seeking modification 
is otherwise eligible for the service.116 
The majority also pointed out that Title II’s implementing regulations add 
some insight into the limited reach of the requirement that public entities 
should require readily accessible services.  “[I]n no event is the entity required 
to undertake measures that would impose an undue financial or administrative 
burden, threaten historic preservation interests, or effect a fundamental 
alteration in the nature of the service.”117 
The Court concluded “Title II, as it applies to the class of cases implicating 
the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of 
Congress’ § 5 authority to enforce the . . . Fourteenth Amendment.”118 
The Court clearly states that Title II is constitutional and enforceable as it 
applies to the class of cases that implicate the fundamental right of access to 
the courts.119  Furthermore, in its analysis of the harm that Title II was enacted 
to prevent, the Court cited several cases that involved the denial of access to 
mentally disabled individuals to the court system, and also characterized this 
denial as an unconstitutional deprivation of rights. 
C. Title II Principles Relevant to Mental Health Courts 
Two fundamental principles relevant to assessment of mental health courts 
emerge from the above discussion of the TAM and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
holding in Lane: equally effective access to mental health court programs and 
integration. 
First, the TAM explains that a state or local government entity’s services, 
programs, or activities must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals 
with disabilities.120  The “program accessibility” standard is not limited to the 
building of new structures or the creation of new programs, but it also applies 
to all existing facilities, programs, and services of a public entity.121  With 
respect to persons with mental disabilities in the criminal justice context, 
defining adequate accessibility for a criminal defendant may be difficult.  For 
instance, does accessibility mean simply a judicial determination of culpability 
not skewed by misunderstandings and prejudices about mental disorders?  Is 
adequate access simply protection against being punished for manifestations of 
a mental disability?  Or does adequate access require something more, such as 
 
 116. Id. at 531-32. 
 117. Id. at 532. 
 118. Id. at 533-34 (emphasis added). 
 119. Id.; see also Goodman v. Georgia, 126 S.Ct. 877, 880-81 (2006) (ruling that the denial of 
access to programs and aid by a prison “amount to ‘exclusion from participation in or . . . den[ial] 
benefit of’ the person’s ‘services, programs or activities.’”). 
 120. TAM, supra note 56, at II-5.1000. 
 121. Id. 
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substantive treatment in a separate mental health court program with specific 
guidelines? 
Second, integration is another key principle that must be considered when 
determining whether the creation of separate mental health courts is in 
compliance with the ADA.  While state and local governments have the right 
to create benefits and services especially for individuals with disabilities, Title 
II requires that a public entity administer all services, programs, and activities 
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals 
with disabilities.122 
The TAM reiterates that one of the primary goals of the ADA is to include 
disabled individuals in the “mainstream” of American society.123  The TAM 
explains that, under the ADA, an individual with a disability shall not be 
denied the opportunity to participate in such programs or activities that are not 
separate or different, notwithstanding the existence of separate or different 
programs or activities provided in accordance with this section.124  
Furthermore, the implementing regulations state that there is no requirement 
that an individual with a disability accept an accommodation, aid, service, 
opportunity, or benefit that he or she chooses not to accept.125  For these 
reasons, it is important that individuals with mental disabilities who are 
diverted into mental health courts have the choice to remain in the regular 
court system. 
When these provisions of the ADA’s implementing regulations are 
considered in conjunction with one another, they operate to “prohibit exclusion 
and segregation of individuals with disabilities and the denial of equal 
opportunities enjoyed by others, based on, among other things, presumptions, 
patronizing attitudes, fears, and stereotypes about individuals with 
disabilities.”126  Accordingly, state and local government entities must ensure 
that their actions and decisions regarding the provision of public services are 
based on an individual’s particular circumstances and “not on presumptions as 
to what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot do.”127  The TAM 
is also instructive on this issue, as it states that while a public entity may offer 
separate or special programs when necessary to provide disabled individuals 
with equal opportunities to benefit from the programs, such programs “must, 
however, be specifically designed to meet the needs of the individuals with 
disabilities for whom they are provided.”128 
 
 122. Id. at II-5.2000. 
 123. Id. at II-3.4000. 
 124. Id. at II-3.4300-3.4400. 
 125. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e)(1) (West 2006). 
 126. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (West 2006). 
 127. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A. 
 128. TAM, supra note 56, at II-3.4100. 
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Although it may be acceptable in some circumstances to provide separate 
services for the disabled, the implementing regulations make it very clear that 
“[i]ntegration is fundamental to the purposes of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act” and that “[p]rovision of segregated accommodations and 
services relegates persons with disabilities to second-class status.”129  The 
TAM further provides that “[p]ublic entities should make every effort to ensure 
that alternative methods of providing program access do not result in 
unnecessary segregation.”130  The TAM also provides an example that is 
instructive for a state that wishes to create a mental health court system that 
deals exclusively with individuals with mental disabilities: 
A school system should provide for wheelchair access at schools dispersed 
throughout its service area so that children who use wheelchairs can attend 
school at locations comparable in convenience to those available to other 
children. Also, where “magnet” schools, or schools offering different curricula 
or instruction techniques are available, the range of choice provided to students 
with disabilities must be comparable to that offered to other students.131 
It is important to remember that even if a public entity provides separate or 
special programs that are designed to better meet the needs of the disabled, 
individuals with disabilities cannot be denied the chance to participate in 
similar programs that are created for the general public, without regard for 
disability status.  The implementing regulations clearly establish this 
interpretation of the statute by stating that “[s]eparate, special, or different 
programs that are designed to provide a benefit to persons with disabilities 
cannot be used to restrict the participation of persons with disabilities in 
general, integrated activities.”132 
Concerns about these Title II principles, particularly integration, arise from 
the idea of creating separate mental health courts.  At first glance, mental 
health courts segregate those defendants with qualifying mental disabilities.  
However, voluntary entry into mental health court programs resolves this issue 
because eligible defendants decide whether or not to enter the program and 
may opt out at any time after entry.133  In actuality, voluntariness can present a 
difficult issue for two reasons: (1) can a defendant deemed incompetent, and 
therefore eligible, really make a knowing and willful choice to enter the mental 
health court program?, and (2) if the defendant is capable of making this 
decision, is the option between the mental health court or jail really a 
 
 129. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A.  See Ohlmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 US 581 (1999) 
(requiring states to provide community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when 
a mental health professional determines that such treatment is appropriate). 
 130. TAM, supra note 56, at II-3.4200. 
 131. Id. 
 132. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A. 
 133. See infra Part IV. 
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choice?134  This latter problem also arises with drug courts, where the choice 
between a treatment program or incarceration seems like a coercive choice at 
best. 
Mental health courts face an additional challenge unique to their target 
population in that a defendant may not really comprehend the choices being 
made.  Thus, while most mental health courts purport to be a voluntary option 
for eligible defendants in theory, in reality this may not be the case.135  Critics 
take issue with this problem in particular, claiming that mental health courts 
are not truly diversionary and may actually violate Title II.136  If defendants 
with mental disabilities have no real choice but to enter the mental health court 
program, they may be disadvantaged by exclusion from the available activities 
of the traditional criminal justice system.137 
Although this argument is certainly meritorious, it ignores a couple of 
important factors.  The abundant statistics about defendants with mental 
disabilities in the regular criminal court indicate that the current criminal 
justice system has failed miserably in its attempts to address the population 
with mental disabilities that comes before it.138  Thus, one is hard pressed to 
understand how the traditional system, which on paper integrates persons with 
mental disabilities but in reality acts to deny that group meaningful access to 
the courts, is itself in compliance with the ADA.139  Moreover, inmates 
suffering from a severe mental illness may not be “qualified” to participate in 
the criminal justice system programs or services if they are considered unstable 
or deemed a threat to personnel or other inmates.140  Individuals who need 
those services may be denied in the traditional system, whereas in the mental 
health courts eligibility hinges upon the level of offense, not stability, and in 
fact, often requires that the defendant have a serious mental illness.141  Thus, 
while voluntariness presents a significant challenge to mental health courts, 
 
 134. See BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, NCJ 18254, EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR 
THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FORT 
LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE, SAN BERNARDINO, AND ANCHORAGE xi (2000), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182504.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) [hereinafter EMERGING 
JUDICIAL STRATEGIES]. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See, e.g., SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH 
MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 135-36 (2001). 
 137. Id. at 136. 
 138. See infra Part III.A. 
 139. See infra Part V. 
 140. Paula N. Rubin & Susan W. McCampbell, The Americans with Disabilities Act and 
Criminal Justice: Mental Disabilities and Corrections, NAT’L INST. OF JUST.: RES. IN ACTION 1, 
3 (July 1995), available at http://www.nicic.org/Library/serial479 (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
 141. See infra Part III.B (describing the eligibility requirements of the first mental health 
courts). 
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careful and thorough evaluation by courtroom teams can help alleviate this 
concern while achieving compliance with Title II. 
To further evaluate these questions about mental health courts under the 
rubric of Title II, one first needs to know more about the background, policy 
goals, structures, and outcomes of existing mental health courts. 
III.  MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 
Part II suggests that a strong case may be made that interpretation of Title 
II allows for mental health courts.  In order to support this argument, more 
must be known about mental health courts.  The following sections explore 
mental health courts, beginning with their historical underpinnings, and then 
identify the policy goals, difficulties, and criticisms involved with these 
entities.  The article then analyzes these specialty courts under Title II and 
provides a glimpse into Ohio’s treatment of persons with mental disabilities 
within the criminal law context. 
A. Historical Context: Derivation of the Mental Health Court Concept 
To reiterate, the ADA defines a mental impairment as “any mental or 
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, 
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.”142  A mental 
illness can further be thought of as: 
[A] group of disorders causing severe disturbances in thinking, feeling, and 
relating.  They result in substantially diminished capacity for coping with 
ordinary demands of life.  A mental illness can have varying levels of 
seriousness.  Identical illnesses can cause different reactions . . . at different 
times in the same person.143 
Early applications of Title II focused solely on criminal facilities themselves, 
namely jails and prisons.144  The scope of the attention at that time emphasized 
ways in which facilities conducted their programs, services, and activities in 
order to insure that eligible inmates with mental disabilities were included in 
accordance with Title II.145  Despite this narrow, post-booking inquiry into 
Title II compliance, however, practitioners realized that “[p]rosecution and 
incarceration are inappropriate responses to symptoms of mental illness” and 
that community diversion programs incorporating multidisciplinary 
 
 142. EEOC, Technical Assistance Manual for the Americans with Disabilities Act § 2.2(a)(i) 
(1992). 
 143. Rubin & McCampbell, supra note 140, at 1-2 (quoting Gerard R. Murphy, Police 
Executive Research Forum, Managing Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Curriculum Guide for 
Police Trainers, 2-5 (1989)). 
 144. See id. at 1. 
 145. Id. at 2. 
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cooperation are more suitable for assisting persons with mental disabilities.146  
Additionally, practitioners also noted the need for “better and more effective” 
approaches for handling the needs of inmates with mental disabilities.147 
The statistics concerning persons with mental illnesses in the criminal 
justice system are staggering.  As of 2004, approximately 1.3 million people 
were in state and federal prisons, while an incredible thirteen million people 
were jailed annually, with 631,000 inmates serving jail time.148  Individuals 
with serious mental illnesses comprised seven percent of those incarcerated at 
the federal level and sixteen percent at the state level, with approximately 
93,000 in prisons, 44,000 in jail, and 320,000 under corrections supervision,149 
generally for non-violent offenses and misdemeanors.150  The demographics 
for this group present a grim picture.  Individuals in this group typically are 
poor, uninsured, disproportionately members of minority groups, homeless, 
suffering with co-existing substance abuse problems and mental disorders, and 
are likely to be repeatedly shuffled through the mental health, substance abuse, 
and criminal justice systems.151  The percentage of women and juveniles with 
mental disabilities entering these systems is also on the rise.152 
Several factors account for disproportionate numbers of persons with 
mental disabilities in the criminal justice system.  During the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s, deinstitutionalization programs placed many individuals with mental 
disabilities into the community.153  Simultaneously, the community mental 
health system failed to effectively absorb and treat these individuals.154  
Furthermore, the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s witnessed an increase in 
homelessness, a population also notoriously overrepresented by individuals 
with mental disabilities.155  The latter two decades also experienced the “War 
Against Drugs,” with law enforcement cracking down on drug offenders, many 
of whom also suffer from mental illness concurrently with a substance abuse 
 
 146. Id. at 2, 4. 
 147. Id. at 6. 
 148. NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, DHHS PUB. NO. SMA-04-3880, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: BACKGROUND PAPER 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/papers/CJ_ADACompliant.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 
2006) [hereinafter “BACKGROUND PAPER”]. 
 149. Id.; EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 2. 
 150. Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental Illnesses: 
The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 U. D.C. L. REV. 143, 145 (2003). 
 151. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 148, at 1; NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL 
HEALTH, ACHIEVING THE PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, 
FINAL REPORT 32 (2003), available at http://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/ 
FinalReport/toc.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) [hereinafter “ACHIEVING THE PROMISE”]. 
 152. ACHIEVING THE PROMISE, supra note 151, at 32. 
 153. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 2. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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problem.156  As a result of these events, many persons with mental disabilities, 
who were unable to function successfully on their own, landed in the criminal 
justice system.157 
Not surprisingly, during the heightened attention on drug enforcement, the 
number of drug-related arrests and prosecutions increased.158  The large 
amount of drug offenders in the criminal justice system, coupled with 
overcrowding in jails and prisons, prompted the creation of specialty drug 
courts to channel some of these offenders out of the criminal justice system.159  
Emergence of the drug courts ushered in a paradigmatic shift from the typical 
“process and punish” philosophy of the criminal justice system to a 
therapeutic, treatment-oriented philosophy.160  The goal of this approach was 
to target and treat the underlying root cause of the crime – substance abuse.161  
Instead of doing this by incarceration, which did little to effectively treat the 
substance abuse, the policy-makers behind the drug courts aimed to 
incorporate a multi-disciplinary team of drug treatment professionals, health 
care professionals, social workers, and criminal justice professionals, with 
judges playing a key role as leader and supervisor.162  Placement of the judge 
in the driver’s seat of a therapeutic approach to drug treatment also marked a 
new way of thinking; normally, judges ruled with a “hands-off” manner.163  
The bifurcation of eligible drug offenders from standard criminal courts into 
drug courts, as well as the general concept of separate courts for special 
categories of offenders, spread throughout the nation.164  Given the common 
co-occurrence of substance abuse and mental illness, as well as the inability of 
criminal courts to effectively address the issues of offenders with mental 
disabilities, contemplation of mental health courts was inevitable. 
Despite the current increase in attention on defendants with mental 
disabilities, the issues accompanying these individuals in the criminal justice 
setting are nothing new.  During the 1960s two courts, one in Chicago and one 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. see Grant H. Morris, Pursuing Justice for the Mentally Disabled, 42 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 757 (2005); Jennifer S. Bard, Re-arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the 
Incarceration of Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical and 
Constitutional Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to the 
Insanity Defense, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2005). 
 158. Id. 
 159. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 3.  Dade County, Florida initiated 
the first drug court in 1989. Id. at 4. 
 160. Id.; Henry J. Steadman, Susan Davidson, & Collie Brown, Mental Health Courts: Their 
Promise and Unanswered Questions, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 457, 457 (2001), available at 
http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/52/4/457.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at 5. 
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in New York City, portrayed the early outlines of mental health courts.165  The 
Municipal Court of Chicago, aided by the Psychiatric Institute, presided over 
misdemeanors.166  The Psychiatric Institute made determinations of 
competency, and the court could recommend diversion alternatives to 
incarceration, such as probation conditioned on outpatient therapy or civil 
commitment.167  The New York City court was similar, although its 
determinations were generally made at the arrest phase rather than the 
dispositional phase like the Chicago court.168  In most instances, however, any 
“alternatives” hinged on the offender’s competency, and a finding of 
“incompetent” usually resulted in either voluntary or involuntary 
commitment.169  Today, the criminal justice system continues to struggle with 
persons with mental disabilities, particularly because many require integrated 
treatment for substance abuse as well as for the mental illness, many are poor 
and cannot afford their medication, and law enforcement officers are often ill-
equipped to deal with situations involving persons with mental disabilities.170  
These difficulties, as well as the escalating population of offenders with mental 
disabilities, overcrowded facilities, success of drug courts, and shift in judicial 
philosophy, paved the way for modern-day mental health courts.   
B. Contemporary Mental Health Courts: Policies and Models 
The new “therapeutic jurisprudence,” which has been embraced by 
specialty courts, particularly mental health courts, 
reflects a focus on “the extent to which legal rule or practice promotes the 
psychological and physical well-being of a person subject to legal 
proceedings” as well as an “exploration of ways mental health and related 
disciplines can help shape the law” and concern with “the roles of lawyers and 
judges in producing therapeutic . . . consequences for individuals involved in 
the legal process.171 
This therapeutic focus translates into the following two goals of mental health 
courts: (1) “break the cycle of worsening mental illness and criminal behavior 
that begins with the failure of the community mental health system and is 
 
 165. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 5-6. 
 166. Id. at 6. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id.  Incompetent misdemeanor offenders had the option of voluntary civil commitment, 
whereas incompetent felony offenders were committed by mandate. Id. 
 170. Id. at 7; Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 150, at 145 (stating that “[d]uring street 
encounters, police officers are almost twice as likely to arrest someone who appears to have a 
mental illness.  A Chicago study of thousands of police encounters found that 47 percent of 
people with a mental illness were arrested, while only 28 percent of individuals without a mental 
illness were arrested for the same behavior”). 
 171. Steadman et al., supra note 160, at 457. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] MENTAL HEALTH COURTS AND TITLE II OF THE ADA 333 
accelerated by the inadequacy of treatment in prisons and jails,” and (2) 
“provide effective treatment options instead of the usual criminal sanctions for 
offenders with mental illnesses.”172  Commentators agree that the way to 
achieve this is via community-based services geared toward diversion of the 
criminal justice system.173  Thus far, mental health courts structurally diverge 
in their attempts to achieve these goals.  The first contemporary mental health 
courts created in Broward County (Fort Lauderdale), Seattle, San Bernardino, 
and Anchorage, attempted to concretely address the shortcomings of the 
criminal justice system and the needs of offenders with mental disabilities.174 
1. The Broward County (Fort Lauderdale) Mental Health Court 
In 1997, Broward County became the first county in the nation to establish 
a mental health court.175  Circuit court Judge Mark Speiser spearheaded an 
inquiry into the plight of defendants with mental disabilities in the criminal 
justice system by leading the Criminal Justice Mental Health Task Force, 
which was formed in 1994.176  The task force, comprised of individuals across 
various disciplines, reached the same conclusions discussed above – the 
normal criminal justice approach worked poorly with respect to its population 
of persons with mental disabilities.177  In response to these findings, the mental 
health court was formed and organized as follows. 
First, the defined goals for the court are to “expedite case processing, 
create effective interactions between [the] mental health and criminal justice 
systems, increase access to mental health services, reduce recidivism, improve 
public safety, [and] reduce [the] length of confinement of mentally ill 
offenders.”178  The mental health court is designed to intervene after arrest for 
 
 172. Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 150, at 148.  See also Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing 
Profession: The Comprehensive Law Movement, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2006). 
 173. Id.; BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 148, at 5.  See also Susan Stefan & Bruce J. 
Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 507 (2005) 
(providing an excellent introduction to mental health courts); LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the 
Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for 
Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 373 (2000). 
 174. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at vii.  For an excellent discussion of 
the important role of therapeutic jurisprudence in the development of mental health courts, drug 
treatment courts and juvenile courts, see Bruce J. Winick and David B. Wexler, Judging in a 
Therapeutic Key: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Courts (Carolina Academic Press) (2003).  
For a more thorough discussion see Gregory L. Acquanva, Comment, Mental Health Courts: No 
Longer Experimental, 36 SETON HALL LAW REV. 971 (2006). 
 175. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 9; Judge Randy T. Rogers, Mental 
Health Courts: Fad or Future? 2 (July 2005), http://www.butlercountyprobatecourt.org/pdf/ 
Mental%20Health%20Courts%20-Illustrated.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
 176. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 9; Rogers, supra note 175, at 2-3. 
 177. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 9; Rogers, supra note 175, at 3. 
 178. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xvii. 
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offenders who suffered from a serious mental illness, organic brain 
impairment, or developmental disability, who committed misdemeanors and 
non-violent felonies.179  Eligible defendants gain entry into the mental health 
court before the disposition of the charges in order to divert the defendant.180  
Potential defendants are generally identified within twenty-four hours of arrest 
or very shortly after a referral from a magistrate, county jail, family member, 
etc. and subjected to a competency evaluation from a private psychiatrist.181  
The judge has the ultimate authority to determine eligibility, with input from 
the “courtroom team” consisting of the judge, prosecutor, public defender, 
court monitor, court clinician, case manager, and mental health court liaison 
before resolution of the charges.182 
Once a defendant is deemed eligible, a treatment plan is created by the 
“courtroom team,” and a defendant undergoing treatment may be monitored up 
to a year, with progress hearings held frequently.183  During the defendant’s 
treatment, the arrest charges are suspended, and if a defendant requests a 
traditional trial at any time, he will be transferred to a traditional criminal court 
but may still receive community-based treatment via the mental health court 
team.184  Noncompliance with a treatment plan rarely results in the use of jail 
time as a sanction.185  Instead, the court may respond by increasing hearings 
before the judge, changing the treatment plan, and increasing support and 
encouragement in keeping in sync with a therapeutic, as opposed to punitive, 
perspective.186  A defendant may be unfavorably terminated, however, if he 
“commits [a] serious new crime, [has] repeated willful violations, or wants to 
get out of [the] program.”187  Under this scenario, the normal sentencing 
options are available to the judge.188  Misdemeanor defendants who 
successfully complete their treatment program generally receive deferred 
prosecution, may withdraw their guilty pleas, and avoid having a conviction 
listed on their record.189  Guilty pleas are entered for more serious offense 
defendants, but those who successfully complete their mental health treatment 
 
 179. Id.  The eligible misdemeanor offenses excluded DUIs and domestic violence. Id.  
Persons with mental disabilities who committed misdemeanor battery offenses were eligible only 
with the victim’s consent. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at xviii. 
 182. Id.  See also Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, The Louisa Van Wezel Schwartz 
Symposium Criminalization of People with Mental Illnesses: The Role of Mental Health Courts in 
System Reform, 7 U. D.C. L. REV. 143 (2003). 
 183. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xix. 
 184. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xix. 
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program receive credit for time served.190  The structure of the Broward 
County mental health court served as the model for later mental health courts. 
2. The King County (Seattle) Mental Health Court 
Inception of the King County mental health court was strongly influenced 
by the Broward County mental health court.191  Unlike the Broward County 
mental health court, which was motivated by general increases in the 
incarcerated population of persons with mental disabilities, King County’s 
attention to the same issue arose with a specific incident – the random murder 
of its fire department captain by an offender with a mental disability in 
1997.192  The offender turned out to be a misdemeanor defendant deemed 
incompetent by the municipal court and released shortly before the murder.193  
Subsequently, the county formed a task force to improve upon the system’s 
handling of defendants with mental disabilities.194 
The goals of the King County Mental Health Court are identical to those of 
the Broward County mental health court, but the structure it uses to achieve 
those goals differs in some ways.195  The mental health court intervention is 
available at the plea/sentencing hearing stage, rather than immediately after 
arrest, and a defendant must enter a plea in order to enter the program.196  Like 
the Broward County court, the King County mental health court is only 
available to defendants who have committed misdemeanors, and defendants 
must suffer from a “serious mental illness or developmental disability that 
triggers [the] charged crime.”197  The county jail screens the defendant for 
signs of mental illness within the first forty-eight hours of arrest but prior to 
the first court hearing.198  Defendants may be referred to the mental health 
court by the county jail, magistrate, family, police, etc., and the defendant 
usually appears before the mental health court within twenty-four hours after 
referral.199  A state hospital psychiatrist conducts the competency evaluation in 
 
 190. Id. at xix.  See also Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 191. Rogers, supra note 175, at 2-3.  Although the Anchorage mental health court technically 
began operation prior to the King County mental health court, in reality King County was the 
second county in the nation to research and consider implementation of such a court. See id.; 
EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at xvii. 
 192. EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES, supra note 134, at 21. 
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 196. Id. at xvii. 
 197. Id.  However, like the Broward County court, the King County court will allow 
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violent offenses are considered on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
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the county jail, unless the defendant is hospitalized.200  Again, the judge has 
the ultimate authority to determine eligibility, with input from a team 
consisting of the judge, prosecutor, public defender, program manager, court 
monitor, jail psychiatric liaison, and probation officer.201 
Eligible defendants begin an interim treatment plan before the charges are 
resolved, and the defendant must return after a couple of weeks to resolve the 
charges.202  Once regular treatment commences, the defendant usually has a 
two-year probationary period supervised by a probation officer and the mental 
health staff at the treating facility, while a court monitor supervises the 
treatment plan itself.203  Unlike the Broward County court, defendants in the 
King County mental health court program typically have convictions on their 
record at the conclusion of treatment, but the sentence gets suspended.204  In 
the rare cases where sentencing dispositions are deferred, defendants who 
successfully complete the program may have their charges dismissed.205  
Regular hearings are held to monitor the defendant’s progress.206  If the 
defendant does not comply with the treatment plan, the judge first increases the 
number of counseling sessions and court hearings but may use jail time to 
sanction the defendant as a last resort.207  Additionally, defendants who request 
to go to trial after acceptance by the mental health court lose their eligibility 
for the mental health court and are referred back to the regular criminal 
court.208 
As mentioned above, defendants who successfully complete the program 
usually receive credit for time served and retain the guilty plea on their 
record.209  In some cases, successful defendants may receive deferred 
prosecution, withdraw their pleas, and get their charges dismissed on a 
recommendation by the district attorney.210  Defendants who repeatedly and 
willfully violate their treatment plans or commit a serious new crime during 
the program are terminated from the mental health court, and the original 
charges are transferred back to the regular criminal court.211 
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3. The Anchorage, Alaska Mental Health Court 
The backdrop prompting the adoption of Anchorage’s mental health court 
in 1998 was even more bleak than that of the rest of the country.  As much as 
one-third of Alaska’s incarcerated population consisted of inmates with mental 
disabilities, largely suffering from serious mental illnesses like developmental 
disabilities and organic brain injuries.212  A commission set up to examine 
overcrowding in Anchorage jails identified persons with mental disabilities as 
a particular difficulty within the system.213  This finding prompted formation 
of a pilot program to divert defendants with mental disabilities from the 
criminal justice system and, ultimately, a mental health court was created in 
1998, modeled after the Broward County and King County systems.214 
The goals, stage of intervention, criminal offense and criminal history 
eligibility, method of entry, and referral processes of the Anchorage court are 
identical to those of the King County mental health court discussed above.215  
The Anchorage system differs, however, in that it involves two programs – the 
Jail Alternative Services (“JAS”) program for individuals with mental 
disabilities already incarcerated, and the Court Coordinated Research Project 
(“CCRP”), which resembles the prior two mental health courts by dealing with 
misdemeanants in the adjudication process.216 
Participation in the JAS program requires that inmates be suffering from a 
“major mental illness with history of psychosis.”217  Eligibility for the CCRP is 
broader, encompassing not only those individuals diagnosed with a serious 
mental illness, developmental disability, or organic brain syndrome, but also 
individuals exhibiting signs of such a condition.218  The courtroom team for the 
programs consists of the judge, prosecutor, public defender, and JAS case 
coordinator.219  The county jail conducts the initial screening of each 
defendant, usually within twenty-four hours of arrest and before 
arraignment.220  For the competency evaluation, defendants in police custody 
are referred to the state hospital, and those defendants not in custody must 
schedule an independent evaluation.221  If a defendant is still incompetent 
ninety days after the initial competency exam, the court reevaluates the 
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situation and may dismiss the charges, particularly if the defendant was civilly 
committed.222 
Like the judges in the previous two mental health courts, the judge in the 
Anchorage system makes the final eligibility determination using the input of 
the courtroom team.223  If a defendant is eligible, a treatment plan is 
formulated as a condition of probation following the sentencing hearing.224  
The typical treatment probation period for individuals in the Anchorage mental 
health court system, three to five years, is much longer than that of the other 
mental health courts.225  In some misdemeanor cases it may run as long as ten 
years.226  Participants in the CCRP are monitored solely by the court and 
prosecutor, and JAS participants are frequently and closely monitored by a 
caseworker.227  Defendants who successfully complete the treatment usually 
still have the conviction on their record but receive a suspended sentence; 
while those few who receive deferred dispositions receive a dismissal of their 
charges.228  Defendants who request trial can still receive treatment from the 
CCRP but proceed before a judge functioning in dual roles as a CCRP judge 
and a regular criminal judge.229  Defendants who have minor violations of their 
treatment plan receive adjustments in their treatment; however, jail time is 
used as a threat, and when repeated efforts at counseling fail, the defendant 
may be jailed.230  Defendants’ participation in the program may be terminated 
for perpetration of a new serious crime or willful and repeated violations of 
their treatment plan, and if this occurs, the original charges are referred to the 
regular criminal court.231 
4. The San Bernardino, California Mental Health Court 
The conditions stimulating the creation of the San Bernardino mental 
health court in 1999 were the same as those leading to the formation of the 
previous three courts – an increase of defendants with mental disabilities in the 
criminal justice system as a result of deinstutionalization and failure within the 
community-based mental health system.232  Specifically, persons with mental 
disabilities comprised 12% of the San Bernardino local jail population.233 
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Again, the goals, structure, and eligibility requirements of this court are 
nearly identical to those of the courts discussed above.234  However, the San 
Bernardino court differs in several key ways.  First, the court considers low-
level felony offenders, rather than just misdemeanor offenders, for 
eligibility.235  Regarding misdemeanants, though, the court will only consider 
ones with a prior record.236  The court carefully screens any defendants with a 
violent felony in their prior criminal history.237  Second, the court only 
receives referrals from the county jail, not outsiders.238  Third, the judge does 
not have the ultimate say in a defendant’s eligibility for the treatment program 
– admission to the program requires the consensus of all of the court team 
members: the judge, prosecutor, public defender, mental health court 
administrator, case managers, and probation officer.239  Treatment begins 
immediately while the individual is still in jail, but the defendant is typically 
released to the program after the first court appearance.240  The sanctions for 
noncompliance available to the mental health court judge range “from 
reprimands by [the] judge to stricter treatment conditions, community service, 
and jail, which are used liberally.”241  The final major difference from this 
program and the others is that the charges are dismissed for defendants who 
successfully finish the treatment, and they may also petition for their record to 
be expunged.242 
These pioneering mental health courts, though differing organizationally, 
clearly began in response to common, recurring problems: inadequate handling 
of persons with mental disabilities by both community-based and criminal 
justice systems, an increase in the number of substance abusers with mental 
disabilities, and the resulting increase in the number of persons with mental 
disabilities cycling through the criminal justice system.243  Despite the 
innovativeness of these specialty courts, problems and criticisms have arisen. 
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IV.  MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: CHALLENGES AND CRITICISMS 
The formation of mental health courts increased across the country 
following the success of drug courts and the inception of the Broward County, 
King County, Anchorage, and San Bernardino mental health courts.244  Today, 
over 100 mental health courts exist throughout the United States.245  As with 
any new entity, however, mental health courts face practical challenges to 
effectuating their goals, creating some skepticism. 
A key component of mental health courts is identifying the “target 
population” as early in the process as possible in order to intervene with the 
appropriate treatment.246  Equally important, however, is the need to accurately 
assess a defendant while maintaining confidentiality.  These needs – speed, 
accuracy, and confidentiality – often conflict during the screening process for 
the following reason: 
Early intervention by the mental health court depends on timely and accurate 
information about the defendants’ criminal justice and mental health 
backgrounds.  However, the goal of early intervention and prompt treatment 
conflicts in part with the need for confidentiality and for consent by the 
defendants to share the mental health information with the court staff.247 
Implementing procedures that adequately address these issues presents a 
difficult dilemma from the outset. 
Another difficulty faced by mental health courts is reconciliation of 
criminal justice goals with mental health treatment goals.248  The creation of 
mental health courts reflects a paradigmatic shift toward therapeutic goals, but 
the purposes of the criminal justice system (e.g. punishment, deterrence, 
retribution, etc.) must also be addressed.  As noted above, however, 
punishment is often inappropriate and ineffective for the root causes of 
mentally ill defendants’ transgressions.  Nonetheless, many mental health 
courts evince a hybrid of both systems’ goals by retaining punitive sanctions as 
a last resort to noncompliance with treatment.249 
Achieving uniformity in composition and in defining success also impose 
obstacles to mental health courts.  For example, the four original mental health 
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courts varied to some degree in their structure and eligibility requirements.250  
Likewise, since each individual grapples with dissimilar problems related to 
the mental illness, one defendants’ success will necessarily differ from another 
defendants’ success.251  Some critics view this fact as a red flag to the rapid 
expansion of mental health courts.252  Drug courts also dealt with uniformity 
issues in the beginning but were eventually unified, unlike mental health 
courts: 
[D]rug courts rapidly moved to a common model aided by technical assistance 
and information on program models from national sources – the Office of 
Justice Programs’ Drug Courts Program Office of the U.S. Department of 
Justice, American University’s National Technical Assistance Center, and the 
National Association of Drug Court Professionals.  Unlike drug courts, mental 
health courts have no such infrastructure or model.  Any similarities among 
current mental health courts occur more or less by chance at the 
implementation level and stem mostly from mirror-imaging by new 
jurisdictions seeking to replicate recently visited mental health courts or to 
duplicate drug courts. 
. . . . 
. . . [A]lmost any special effort by the courts to better address the needs of 
persons with serious mental illness who engage with the criminal justice 
system can qualify as a mental health court by current standards.  In its 
diffusion, the [mental health court] concept has come to have little meaning. 
. . . . 
Until similar evidence-based conclusions [to that of drug courts] about 
appropriate structures and interventions are available for mental health courts, 
some pause may be advisable before widespread implementation.253 
In recognition of this criticism, proponents of mental health courts responded 
by articulating a general definition of a mental health court as follows: 
A specialized court docket for certain defendants with mental illnesses that 
substitutes a problem-solving model for traditional court processing.  
Participants are identified through specialized screening and assessments, and 
voluntarily participate in a judicially supervised treatment plan developed 
jointly by a team of court staff and mental health professionals.  Incentives 
reward adherence to the treatment plan and other court conditions, non-
adherence may be sanctioned, and success or graduation is defined according 
to specific criteria.254 
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Furthermore, proponents have outlined ten essential elements a mental health 
court should possess to achieve success: (1) Goals, (2) Target Population, (3) 
Confidentiality, (4) Terms of Participation, (5) Informed and Voluntary 
Choice, (6) Participant Identification, (7) Integration of Treatment and 
Community Supports, (8) The Court Team, (9) Monitoring Adherence to Court 
Conditions, and (10) Sustainability.255  How these elements are incorporated 
structurally should necessarily be left to each court based on system needs and 
the demographics of the particular jurisdiction. 
The final major challenge presented to mental health courts is one common 
to any organization – resources.  Part of the problem contributing to the 
increase of mentally ill persons’ entrance into the criminal justice system, as 
well as that system’s failure to adequately deal with the population of persons 
with mental disabilities, is a lack of resources and training.  Ironically, mental 
health courts rely, at least to some extent, on these same community-based 
resources in their treatment plans.256  Critics assert that, despite good 
intentions, mental health courts may face the same doom as the traditional 
criminal system unless funding and resources are greatly improved.257 
As with any innovative concept, mental health courts face difficulties and 
critiques.  As mental health courts continue to be implemented, attempts to 
remedy and adjust to these difficulties will undoubtedly be made.  Moreover, 
more empirical studies of mental health court outcomes are warranted to aid in 
tweaking the mental health court system.  In the meantime, the visible 
successes and failures of existing mental health courts help shape future courts 
and programs.  Ohio’s current experiment with the diversion of defendants 
with mental disabilities is one such reflection of these concepts.258 
V.  ANALYSIS OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS UNDER TITLE II 
Persons with mental disabilities can present major challenges to law 
enforcement personnel who sometimes mistake manifestations of mental 
illness for criminal activity and to state court systems that must then try to deal 
with persons with mental disabilities in an appropriate manner.  Obviously, 
some training in dealing with people with mental disabilities would be of great 
benefit to the law enforcement and state court personnel who regularly face 
these situations.  By possessing a better understanding of mental disabilities 
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and their symptoms, state court systems can more adequately provide for the 
needs of individuals with disabilities and for state judicial systems as a whole. 
This principle forms the foundation of the policy for creating and 
maintaining mental health courts.  Currently, statistical information regarding 
the relative successes of mental health courts is very limited.  If mental health 
courts are more effective in reducing recidivism and providing adequate 
treatment for individuals with mental disabilities, it seems fairly certain that 
these courts will pass muster under the ADA as a separate, segregated judicial 
system, so long as individuals who are diverted into this system still have the 
option to participate in the “regular” court system.  If mainstream state court 
systems are not providing mentally disabled persons with adequate or equal 
services and opportunities, both the existing case law and the guidance offered 
by the DOJ seem to clearly indicate that mental health courts may even be 
required under the ADA so that state court systems are readily accessible to 
persons with mental disabilities. 
In Lane, the Supreme Court noted that Title II “seeks to enforce a variety 
of . . . basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to 
more searching judicial review.”259  The Court noted that the right of access to 
the court system is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; the Due Process and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment; as well as 
a right to access to criminal proceedings that is guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.260  The Court explained that whether Title II enforces all of these 
constitutional rights is a question that “must be judged with reference to the 
historical experience which it reflects.”261  The Court was convinced that Title 
II was designed to address harm that often resulted from “a pattern of 
unconstitutional treatment in the administration of justice.”262 
The Court carefully examined the history of discrimination based on 
disability in this country.263  “Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of 
pervasive unequal treatment . . . in the administration of state services and 
programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.”264 
The Lane opinion went on to provide numerous examples of the unequal 
treatment of physically and mentally disabled individuals in our society, 
including the fact that “as of 1979, most States categorically disqualified idiots 
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from voting, without regard to individual capacity. . . . [A] number of States 
have prohibited and continue to prohibit persons with disabilities from 
engaging in activities such as marrying and serving as jurors.”265  The Court 
further explained that a long line of Supreme Court cases that “have identified 
unconstitutional treatment of disabled persons by state agencies in a variety of 
public programs and services[,]” further reinforcing the proposition that 
“[d]ifficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies.”266 
Some of the examples of previous cases that implicated disability 
discrimination that the Court gave as evidence of a systemic problem included, 
“unjustified commitment, the abuse and neglect of persons committed to state 
mental health hospitals, and irrational discrimination in zoning decisions.”267 
The Lane opinion makes it clear that state court systems must be readily 
accessible to persons with disabilities, which the ADA, the implementing 
regulations, and the TAM explicitly state includes persons with mental 
disabilities.268 
The TAM is also instructive on the rights of disabled individuals to 
participate in programs that are designed without regard for disability status.269  
“Qualified individuals with disabilities are entitled to participate in regular 
programs, even if the public entity could reasonably believe that they cannot 
benefit from the regular program.”270  The TAM also clarifies that just because 
a special program has been created for persons with a disability, a public entity 
must still make its regular programs accessible to disabled individuals, 
although the requirement that a disabled individual should be “qualified” to 
participate in the program still applies.271  The TAM also clarifies that a 
disabled individual who is qualified for a regular program cannot be denied 
access to the regular program because a special program has been created.  
Disabled individuals are not required to accept any special “benefits” if they 
choose not to do so.272  The TAM gives some examples of the practical 
application of this principle: 
ILLUSTRATION 1: A museum cannot exclude a person who is blind from a 
tour because of assumptions about his or her inability to appreciate and benefit 
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from the tour experience. Similarly, a deaf person may not be excluded from a 
museum concert because of a belief that deaf persons cannot enjoy the music. 
ILLUSTRATION 2: Where a State offers special drivers’ licenses with 
limitations or restrictions for individuals with disabilities, an individual with a 
disability is not eligible for an unrestricted license, unless he or she meets the 
essential eligibility requirements for the unrestricted license. 
ILLUSTRATION 3: A State that provides optional special automobile license 
plates for individuals with disabilities and requires appropriate documentation 
for eligibility for the special plates cannot require an individual who qualifies 
for a special plate to present documentation or accept a special plate, if he or 
she applies for a plate without the special designation.273 
The implementing regulations also provide an example that is instructive as to 
whether or not creating separate or special services for the individuals with 
disabilities violates the ADA: 
[I]t would be a violation of this provision to require persons with disabilities to 
eat in the back room of a government cafeteria or to refuse to allow a person 
with a disability the full use of recreation or exercise facilities because of 
stereotypes about the person’s ability to participate.274 
These illustrations and examples clearly indicate that a public entity, such as a 
state’s judicial system, cannot require an individual with a mental disability to 
accept diversion into a mental health court if he or she wants to participate in 
the mainstream state courts, rather than the special mental health court, even 
though the latter may provide particular services that are better suited to fulfill 
the needs of that individual. 
Two other illustrations from the TAM help clarify when a public entity 
may create and provide special or separate programs without running afoul of 
the ADA: 
ILLUSTRATION 1: Museums generally do not allow visitors to touch exhibits 
because handling can cause damage to the objects.  A municipal museum may 
offer a special tour for individuals with vision impairments on which they are 
permitted to touch and handle specific objects on a limited basis. (It cannot, 
however, exclude a blind person from the standard museum tour.) 
ILLUSTRATION 2: A city recreation department may sponsor a separate 
basketball league for individuals who use wheelchairs.275 
It is important to remember that a public entity that creates a special 
program for persons with disabilities, such as mental health courts, cannot later 
disproportionately cut all programs for the disabled when there are no 
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alternative equivalent programs available.276  If a public entity is going to 
provide services for individuals who do not have disabilities, then they should 
also provide some sort of alternative programming for individuals with 
disabilities.277  If a state’s judicial branch fails to offer persons with mental 
disabilities access to the state court system by not effectively treating the 
underlying illness or allowing the individual to sufficiently participate in the 
judicial system, it seems clear that the state is violating the ADA’s mandate to 
provide readily accessible programs and services. 
As discussed above, integration is a key goal of the ADA, and this 
principle is discernible in all of the aforementioned explanations and 
illustrations.  Clearly the DOJ, in drafting the implementing regulations and the 
TAM, believed that this principle is crucial to eradicating disability 
discrimination in American society.  While recognizing that the creation of 
separate or special programs can be beneficial to individuals with disabilities, 
the ADA mandates that state and local governments cannot create these 
programs in an attempt to segregate disabled individuals out of regular 
programs that are designed without consideration of disabilities.278 
It is important to note that when a public entity’s facilities, services, and 
programs are evaluated for conformity with this standard, compliance is 
measured by looking at the public entity as a whole.279  Therefore, a public 
entity is not necessarily required to make each of their existing facilities, 
programs, and services accessible to individuals with disabilities.280  The TAM 
provides some examples that make this point clearer: 
ILLUSTRATION 1: When a city holds a public meeting in an existing 
building, it must provide ready access to, and use of, the meeting facilities to 
individuals with disabilities.  The city is not required to make all areas in the 
building accessible, as long as the meeting room is accessible. Accessible 
telephones and bathrooms should also be provided where these services are 
available for use of meeting attendees. 
ILLUSTRATION 2: D, a defendant in a civil suit, has a respiratory condition 
that prevents her from climbing steps. Civil suits are routinely heard in a 
courtroom on the second floor of the courthouse. The courthouse has no 
elevator or other means of access to the second floor. The public entity must 
relocate the proceedings to an accessible ground floor courtroom or take 
alternative steps, including moving the proceedings to another building, in 
order to allow D to participate in the civil suit. 
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ILLUSTRATION 3: A State provides ten rest areas approximately 50 miles 
apart along an interstate highway. Program accessibility requires that an 
accessible toilet room for each sex with at least one accessible stall, or a unisex 
bathroom, be provided at each rest area.281 
Again, if regular mainstream state court systems do not meet the basic 
needs of persons with mental disabilities, then the public entity is likely 
violating Title II because it is not making its judicial system readily accessible 
to persons with mental disabilities.  Moreover, if mainstream state courts deny 
individuals with mental disabilities with adequate services or equal 
opportunities, mental health courts are arguably necessary to bring the state’s 
court system into compliance with the ADA. 
VI.  OHIO’S RESPONSE TO THE MENTAL HEALTH TRENDS 
Ohio’s experience with offenders with mental disabilities mirrors that of 
the rest of the nation.  Since 1995, Ohio has had community linkage programs 
in place to provide mental health care to inmates, aid in the transition from 
prison to the community and vice versa, and maintain continuous treatment.282  
The need for further intervention, however, became apparent.  In March of 
2000, Ohio prisons housed 6,393 prisoners with mental disabilities, 3,051 of 
whom were severely mentally disabled.283  A study of 1998 incarceration rates 
revealed that 432 of every 100,000 Ohio residents were incarcerated, the 
thirteenth highest rate in the nation.284  As with most of the country, Ohio’s 
“community mental health system and the criminal justice system are not 
equipped to handle the current situation.”285 
In May of 2000, Akron implemented one of the first programs in the state 
designed to address this issue by developing a Crisis Intervention Team 
(“CIT”).286  The CIT was established to encourage collaboration between law 
enforcement and the mental health community by training law enforcement 
personnel the way to appropriately respond to situations involving individuals 
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with mental disabilities.287  Officers must apply for the CIT training, and the 
training is provided to law enforcement personnel for free.288  As of January 
2002, Akron’s CIT program had been relatively successful at diverting persons 
with mental disabilities from the criminal justice system.289  Forty-five percent 
of the first 483 law enforcement encounters with individuals with mental 
disabilities “resulted in referral to the county’s psychiatric emergency facility 
and another 37% were referred to hospital emergency departments.”290  Only 
six percent ended in arrest.291 
Butler County, Ohio became the first county in Ohio to begin inquiring 
about the possibility of a mental health court when it held the Southwest Ohio 
Regional Forum on Mental Health Courts and the Mentally Ill Offender in 
November of 1999.292  Judge Speiser from the Broward County Mental Health 
Court and Judge Cayce from the King County Mental Health Court spoke at 
the forum about the development of mental health courts in their respective 
jurisdictions.293  In 2001, Ohio Supreme Court Justice Evelyn Lundberg 
Stratton, a major advocate of alternatives for offenders with mental disabilities 
in Ohio, created the Ohio Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Mentally Ill 
in the Courts.294  This committee is comprised of various individuals and 
entities, such as the state departments of Mental Health, Alcohol, and Drug 
Addiction Services, Rehabilitation and Correction, and Criminal Justice 
Services, numerous judges and law enforcement officials, housing and 
treatment providers, consumer advocacy and legal rights groups, and others.295 
Also in 2000, the Ohio Department of Mental Health (“ODMH”) gave 
grants to the following thirteen counties to develop jail diversion programs: 
Athens, Clark, Clermont, Columbiana, Fairfield, Franklin, Gallia, Lake, 
Licking/Knox, Lucas, Montgomery, Tuscarawas, and Washington.296  These 
counties established various programs such as CIT, pre and post-booking 
programs with follow-up after release, case management programs 
incorporating housing and vocational components, and referral programs.297 
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In 2001, the ODMH also awarded a grant to the Summit County Alcohol, 
Drug, and Mental Health Services Board to create a Coordinating Center of 
Excellence (“CCOE”) to research and support jail diversion alternatives.298  
Furthermore, community-based correctional facilities (“CBCF”) also provide 
another diversion option for qualifying offenders.  CBCF’s are “residential 
programs that provide comprehensive treatment for offenders on felony 
probation.  They provide an in-house alternative to jail or prison.”299  
Seventeen CBCF’s were operating in Ohio as of September 2002 and had 
diverted 4,617 offenders from the state prison system in 2001.300 
As of May 2002, challenges had cropped up, including identifying housing 
and employment, integrating multiple local systems and entities, and 
encouraging offenders to voluntarily participate.301 
In 2002, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction funded two 
pilot projects in Hamilton and Cuyahoga Counties to implement Assertive 
Community Treatment (“ACT”) programs.302  These programs provide 
comprehensive services to severely mentally disabled inmates after their 
release in an effort to prevent recidivism.303  Preliminary data evaluations 
indicate “decreased usage of jail, prison and psychiatric bed days” as of June 
2003.304  Additionally, Hamilton County also operates a juvenile mental health 
court,305 as well as an intervention program specifically for women offenders 
suffering from mental illness and/or substance abuse.306  As of November 
2003, the women’s program had tremendous clinical success: 94% of the 
women had reduced their level of symptom distress; 100% of the women 
improved their substance abuse behavior, while 94% reduced their substance 
abuse attitudes and feelings; 81% of the women improved their overall level of 
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functioning; 100% of the graduates had safe and adequate child care; 67% of 
the women have safe, adequate, and permanent housing; 47% of the women 
had adequate work and attachment to the labor force; and only 13% of those 
women who had graduated were convicted of a new crime since completing 
the program.307 
Currently, mental health dockets exist in Butler, Cuyahoga, Hamilton, 
Mahoning, Montgomery, Richland, and Summit Counties.308  Five other 
counties have mental health/criminal justice programs, and 14 counties are 
currently planning similar initiatives.309  Ohio has also established model jail 
standards to deal with offenders with mental disabilities in jail.310  Clearly, 
Ohio has put forth tremendous effort to reverse the “revolving door” problem 
whereby “[j]ails and prisons have become the de facto mental health system of 
our day”311 and to combat the challenges that accompany these innovative 
solutions. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Title II mandates that state and local judicial facilities be accessible to 
individuals with disabilities.  The increasing number of offenders with mental 
disabilities, who are often substance abusers, cycling through criminal justice 
systems across the country reveals that meaningful access to the courts is not 
occurring.  Recent shifts in paradigmatic approaches to special populations 
such as drug offenders and offenders with mental disabilities, along with the 
advent of specialty drug courts, have lead to the creation of mental health 
courts specifically designed to address the needs of the persons with mental 
disabilities in order to avoid incarceration.  These relatively new interventions 
still have flaws that require improvement, but early outcomes in states like 
Ohio suggest mental health courts may better serve the purposes of Title II 
and, more importantly, the needs of individuals with serious mental 
disabilities.  Jurisdictions considering implementation of mental health courts, 
as well as those jurisdictions that already have them, should take caution to 
ensure that personnel are well-trained to recognize and interact with persons 
with mental disabilities and that alternative programs truly are voluntary to 
avoid violation of Title II. 
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